Introduction. The opening citations cryptically delineate two views concerning the causes of the recent financial crisis. On the one hand, the role of incentives is perceived to play a crucial if not the major causal role. Specifically, the argument that will surely find sympathy among economists advances the proposition that misaligned incentives -the focus on short-term rewards without considering long-term consequences -played the critical role in fomenting the crisis as well as being the driving force behind its ultimate severity. My intention is to provide mostly anecdotal evidence for this proposition; the limited empirical work that is available as well as other anecdotes suggests that the cause lies elsewhere.
The alternative explanation and the one I favor and will try to support -again anecdotally -focuses on management failures. The distinction between financial institutions that survived and those that failed can be directly related to be senior managements' comprehension of the risks of amassing large holdings of "toxic" assets and dealing successfully with minimizing the presence of these assets on their banks' balance sheets. The contrast is clearest in the behavior of JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs on the one hand and Bear, Stearns, Lehman, and AIG on the other. The distinction lies primarily in the behavior of the CEOs. Furthermore, I contend that boards of directors, which presumably are responsible for corporate policy and should play a significant monitoring role, were most often ill-suited to undertake this function. Indeed, given the nature of financial institutions, whose balance-sheet values and liquidity positions can vary by large percentages on a day-to-day basis, boards can never monitor management behavior in a timely fashion.
If I am correct, I come to Kahneman's point in the second introductory citation: great success, while obviously not unrelated to talent, hinges mostly on luck. Conversely, failure hinges heavily (predominantly?) on ill-luck rather than skill. A persuasive argument can be made that the reasons Chase and Goldman Sachs survived and Bear, Stearns, Lehman, and AIG succumbed was attributable to the former being headed by lucky leaders in contrast to ill-starred management in the latter.
That leads me to a very pessimistic conclusion. To have the right management group in the right place at the right time cannot be preordained; that, too, is a matter of luck. Hence, corporate boards of directors, even with the best of will and with excellent personnel information, cannot be certain that the CEOs they appoint will be able to avert a catastrophe to their corporation. Nor can present public policy, which in the guise of the Dodd-Frank Act and similar regulations elsewhere is heavily focused on limiting incentives to prevent another crisis, be very effective. Indeed, no public policy is capable of securing lucky outcomes.
The plan of this paper is as follows. A necessarily brief survey of the crisis opens, highlighting the various components that were deemed by consensus to have been critical, followed by a terse review of the major events that transpired during 2007 and 2008 . Section II highlights the role of incentives in each of the areas mentioned in Section I. It will be evident that a convincing case can be made for misaligned incentives at each juncture of the financial marketplace. Section III examines more critically the role of incentives for top-level management, and dismisses incentives as significant drivers explaining their behavior. If that account is inadequate, then an explanation must be provided to clarify why senior management permitted the misaligned structure to persist. Were they not aware of what was going on? Were they aware but were blinded by false hopes as to the consequences of their policies? Did some managements succumb to hubris? All these questions can be answered affirmatively with the anecdotal evidence assembled in this section. Section IV examines first the role of risk decline in the value of their assets would eliminate their capital. A related salient point is that these institutions hovered below the radar of the regulatory authorities. Finally, as indicated by Figure 4 , they became an ever-stronger presence in the U.S. financial system.
• the expansion of the housing market into a real estate bubble. While it is easier to identify a bubble in retrospect, the rapid rise in housing prices that defied an explanation based upon population and income growth as well as their subsequent steep fall ( Figure 5 ) strongly supports the thesis of a ballooning and then bursting bubble.
• Figure 5 also points out the low interest-rate environment that has been considered another crucial foundation of the buildup to the crisis. Figure 6 shows that phenomenon more clearly, focusing on the decline in interest on 30-year mortgages, reaching historic lows during the early and mid-2000s. Such low interest rates both encouraged new borrowing, and, insofar as they reflect the general interest rate environment (they do!), led savers and financial institutions to search out higher-yielding opportunities.
• Financial innovation -the combined impact of securitization and the "originate-to-sell" model -led to a reduction in the quality of mortgages and promoted a disconnect between the mortgage lender and the ultimate investor. While packaging loans of various sorts, including mortgages, into marketable assets is not a recent phenomenon, there were some notable differences between past practices and pre-crisis activities. First, in the past, lenders typically either retained mortgages on their own books or sold them off to one of the governmentsponsored enterprises (GSE) such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. The GSEs fostered market quality at the lender end because they imposed strict constraints on the nature of the mortgages they were willing to acquire. In either case, one major consideration in granting the mortgage -5-was the borrower's ability to pay. But under originate-to-sell, as lenders passed off the loans and hence the credit risk to others, they were less concerned about the quality of the borrowers. As a result, a host of subprime mortgages (with fascinating names such as "liar loans" and "ninja [No income, no job or assets] loans") and a variety of mortgage terms such as 2/28 adjustable rate mortgages and interest-only loans entered the market and began to play a more significant role over the later years of the decade (Figure 7 ).
Moreover, the packaging and repackaging of subprime mortgages by the investment banking community -aided and abetted by the credit rating agencies (CRAs) -led to an opaque system of derivatives. Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) gave rise to collateralized debt obligations (CDO) that were often repackaged (CDO-squared and -cubed) (Figure 8 ), especially for those tranches (viz. components of the issue) whose credit ratings were below AAA. Indeed, one of the sleight-of-hand tactics practiced by the investment community and the CRAs was to take the so-called mezzanine (B-range tranches) of MBSs and transform them into AAA-rated CDOs.
• The ultimate investors -sophisticated buyers of investment products who surprisingly also included some of the very financial institutions that themselves were originators and marketers of these mortgage-related investments -were apparently lulled into acquiring these derivatives partly on the basis of their excellent credit ratings. Some, in addition, protected themselves by relying on another financial innovation, credit default swaps (CDS), that essentially is insurance against specified adverse outcomes, including default, on the derivatives.
• The size of the derivatives market was immense ( Figure 9 ). No less important, its opacity meant that no lender to the shadow banks active on the market was clear about the liquid asset portfolio dropped precipitously on 10 March to $12 billion and on 13 March to $2 billion as some lenders requested increased collateral on their loans while others simply refused to rollover their overnight and other short-term loans.
The per-share price of Bear Stearns in June 2007 was $140. Note, too, that the final price paid by Chase was $10 a share as a result of some contractual issues that forced Chase to raise its offer. That weakness is also evident in the commercial paper market, which is heavily dominated by loans to the shadow banks ( Figure 14) . After peaking in the first half of 2007 at $2.2 trillion, it declines by almost a fifth through the first half of 2008.
Then, a lull, which in retrospect is more akin to the eye of the storm. And while the TED spread declines, it doesn't revert to June '07 levels. Similarly, the commercial paper market stabilizes, declining only slightly from March through September.
The week that was begins on 7 September when the U.S. Treasury nationalizes -technically, places into conservatorship -the GSEs. The mortgage guarantees and MBS holdings of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have forced them into insolvency. The Lehman Brothers failure occurs on 15
September after a futile weekend of rescue attempts. Merrill, Lynch is acquired by Bank of America over that weekend. Figures 13 and 14 demonstrate clearly their impact both on interest rates and on commercial paper market volume; a pervasive flight to safety occurs as lenders seek to avoid shortThe literature on this September week is voluminous. A short and noteworthy piece is James B. Stewart, "Eight Days," -8-term lending to financial institutions. Indeed, the shock of the Lehman bankruptcy is so disruptive that AIG, whose credit default swaps ostensibly stood behind the failing derivatives, is taken over on 16 September by the U.S. Treasury with the aid of the Federal Reserve, because AIG cannot make good on its obligations. A massive liquidity drain faced by the money market mutual fund industry is relieved only after the U.S. Treasury announces its support to them on 18 September. Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, the two remaining independent investment banks, seek a safe haven after watching their stock prices diminish by 24 and 14 percent respectively; they become bank holding companies under Federal Reserve System supervision on 21 September. The term common at the time was: "the markets have seized up," referring not only to financial markets in the United
States, but in Europe and Asia as well. Figure 15 depicts the behavior of the S&P 500 index; on 15 September, the Dow-Jones industrial index plummeted by over 4 percent while Figure 16 contrasts the common share stock prices of some major players in the financial market place on 30 June '07 and 30 December '08. 4 Stewart sums it up nicely: Lehman Brothers begat the Reserve [Fund, a MMMF] collapse, which begat the moneymarket run, so the money-market funds wouldn't buy commercial paper. The commercial-paper market was on the brink of destruction. At this point, the banking system stops functioning. You're pulling four trillion dollars out of the private sector … and giving it to the government in the form of T-bills [viz. a flight to safety]. That was commercial paper funding GE, Citigroup, FedEx, all the commercial-paper issuers. This was systemic risk. Suddenly, you have a global bank holiday.
"Compensation structures were skewed all along the mortgage securitization chain, from people who originated 6 mortgages to people on Wall Street who packaged them into securities." The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (henceforth, FCIC), p. 64.
The same holds true for the hedge funds, whose annual charges are 2 and 20, that is, a flat 2 percent fee of invested 7 funds plus 20 percent of the annual increment in portfolio value.
A sales and marketing trainer cited in FCIC (p. 8) testified that he taught his trainees: "You had no incentive whatsoever 8 to be concerned about the quality of the loan...." Similarly, "For [mortgage} brokers, compensation generally came as up-front fees ... so the loan's performance mattered little." (p. 90) Again, "The mortgage originators profited when they sold loans for securitization. Some of this profit flowed down to employees -particularly those generating mortgage volume.... 'The originators, the loan officers, account executives, basically the salespeople [who] were the reason our loans came in ... were compensated very well,' New Century's Patricia Lindsay told the FCIC. And volume mattered more than quality." (p. 117). See also the remarks of FDIC chair Bair and SEC chair Schapiro in FCIC, p. 64.
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II. The role of incentives in the financial crisis
The reward structure in each facet of the buildup to the crisis stressed short-term compensation at the expense of the longer-term consequences. In this section, we survey compensation policies in mortgage lending, the investment banks that issued the derivatives (MBS, CDO, and CDS), and the credit-rating agencies. In general, bonuses were based on annual 6 performance; the largest share was paid out immediately. While some financial institutions also 7 required their employees to defer some part of their compensation and/or to take some part of the annual bonus in company stock, none (to the best of my knowledge) mandated clawbacks should employee actions have led to an adverse impact on their companies that became evident only later.
Hence, the potential losses suffered by their firms did not play an active role in deciding whether to engage in any activity, how significant should that activity be, and whether and when to reduce the scale of that activity.
1. In the mortgage-origination market. IBGYBG typifies the attitude of many of the lenders' employees and agents. By the time the poor-quality loans soured, the initiating employee would long be gone as would be with their bonuses that were based on volume of loans, not loan quality. who told him "that mortgage brokerage was the greatest business on earth. Bar none. They were all earning between $300,000 and $600,000. ... They cheerfully confirmed that they were all on double commission: Takes a tough man to sell this stuff, and New Century is prepared to pay for the best."
As to the possibility of defaults by mortgagees, "They dismissed this with even more panache. Not our concern, pal. Our job is to sell the mortgage policy. Period Morgan Stanley, it was a private company. When it's a private company, you don't get paid until you retire. I mean you get a good, you know, year-to-year compensation.' But the big payout was 'when you retire.'" When Goldman Sachs was constituted as a partnership, all bonuses were added to the partners' equity and could be withdrawn only upon retiring from the firm, and even then, they still retained some equity.
"Levy [Goldman's senior partner from 1969 -1976] once explained the Goldman partnership economics: 'We've got a hard and fast rule. We pay salaries -modest by today's salary levels. On top of that, we pay six percent interest on capital. On the profit at the end of the year, we pay partners' taxes. managed an incentive system that rewarded the troops for gambling the franchise. Traders' bonuses were paid at year-end, but the 'profits' on which the bonuses were based derived from trades whose true profitability would not be known for many years."
Clementi et. al. cite a specific case at United Bank of Switzerland (UBS) concerning CDOs, concluding that "These facts meant that the CDO desk had the incentive to grow the balance sheet as large as possible because, by construction, their bonuses were tied to instant [i.e., annual] if we left, it would be months, maybe years, before we could get our hands on the money. Each year we left behind enormous sums payable only in the firm's stock sometime in the future." He mentions there that one of his departing colleagues, and while she could sell some of her stock, presumably the segment that was vested, had to leave the rest in her account. A friend of mine who left Lehman shortly before it went bankrupt was advised by his immediate superior early in his career there to sell his Lehman shares as soon as he could, enabling him to diversify his portfolio. Needless to say, those who retained ownership in their Lehman stocks lost their entire holdings upon Lehman's bankruptcy. It is nevertheless likely that past [i.e., prior to 2009] remuneration policies ... have created incentives for some executives and traders to take excessive risks and have resulted in large payments in reward for activities which seemed profit making at the time but subsequently proved harmful to the institution, and in some cases to the entire system.
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However, it would be misleading to imply that these investment bankers received all their compensation immediately in cash. It was not unusual for the investment banks to pay part of the bonuses in corporate stocks that could not be sold immediately but over a multi-year period. For example, Bear Stearns's policy noted by the FCIC was as follows: "For senior executives, about half of each bonus was paid in cash, and about half in restricted stock that vested over three years and had to be held for five." Lehman had a similar plan, so much so that when an employee left, she risked revenue that the rating agency derives from issuers or issues that the analyst rates, or with whom the analyst regularly interacts...
[A]nalysts' salaries generally were based on seniority and experience, and bonuses were determined both by individual performance and the overall success of the firm. The Staff's review did not find indications that rating agencies compensated analysts in a manner contrary to their stated policies. SEC, CRA relates to the incentive structure at the rating agencies.
By way of background, it should be noted that investment bankers shopped the rating agencies for ratings that would enable them to market their derivative products. The better the ratings carried 22 by an issue, the easier to sell it. As such, the securitizers had some negotiating power, enabling them to play the major CRAs against each other. Since CRA sales personnel were rewarded for bringing in business to their employers -volume, not quality mattered -their incentive was volume-directed.
Later downgrades would not retroactively affect their bonuses.
Compensation of the analysts at the CRAs, who were responsible for the ratings recommendations, was not directly related to sales volume. Indeed, the proverbial Chinese wall was erected between the analysts and the sales representatives so that the analysts would provide objective ratings.
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It has been claimed that this wall was permeable and the analysts were complicit in exaggerating the ratings. After all, the analysts understood that they indirectly profited from their sales colleagues' efforts -larger firm profits meant larger bonuses for everyone, analysts included. And Thus, the incentive to focus on annual income without considering risk and long-term consequences pervaded the institutional structure of the financial marketplace.
The reward structure had another outcome: talent moved to the best-paying employers. While this is hardly surprising, its unanticipated consequences exacerbated the crisis. First, during the precrisis years when investment bankers were earning bonuses that were considerably larger than those paid to CRA personnel, the more sought-after talent moved away from the CRAs. That left both fewer The oft-quoted statement of Citigroup's CEO Prince that "As long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance," (Financial Times, July 9, 2007) was said to explain a similar phenomenon: not paying competitive salaries meant valuable employees would depart for hedge funds or to set up independent shops.
We disregard for now the role of the boards of directors. -16-and less qualified analysts to rate the ever-more complex derivatives. 26 Second, this same phenomenon existed vis-a-vis the regulatory agencies. Federal regulators are compensated along federal (and Federal Reserve) guidelines that provides for a fixed pay schedule (albeit with numerous steps and promotion possibilities) but lack incentive payments. It is not unusual for novice employees to enter the federal service (a situation not limited to the bank/security regulatory agencies), gain experience therein, and then move to the higher-paying private sector. One could surmise that as the rewards in the financial sector rose dramatically during the early to mid-'00s, this tendency was exacerbated. While this is hardly the only explanation of why the regulatory agencies performed poorly during the build up to the crisis, it is not a reason that is easily dismissible.
The upshot of this section is that significant financial incentives were available to a variety of participants in the financial marketplace. But these were fundamentally lower-level players, who responded to the compensation structure fashioned by the senior levels of management. Hence, a 27 convincing argument about the critical nature of the incentive structure requires an examination of the incentives as they affected senior management. If it can be shown that the same incentives were pervasive at the senior level, then a case can be made for the crucial nature of the incentive structure.
But if, in fact, senior management were complicit in arranging for the incentive structure at the lower Journal of Financial Economics, v. 99 (2011), pp. 11 -26. 28 Prager, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007/8 (Austrian Colloquium, 4/12) -17-levels but were not driven by the same motivation, we need to discern what precisely drove the upper levels. Why did they not impose policies that related compensation to risk?
The next section examines rewards at the highest echelons -CEOs and senior management.
III. Senior management in financial institutions
Data on the uppermost echelons of U.S. corporations derive for the most part from formal documents such as company annual reports and SEC filings such as forms 10-K and DEF 14A, which is conveyed prior to annual meetings and which contains detailed information deemed necessary for stockholders to vote intelligently. Among the information released to the SEC are the compensation arrangements for five "named executive officers," the leading corporate officers including the CEO and the CFO. This information has two flaws for analyzing upper-echelon incentives. First, information on the top five is too confining; the primary decision-makers in corporations are not necessarily the named executive officers. Second and perhaps more important, the data preclude information on other significant earning executives, who presumably have some voice in corporate decision-making. Traders and division heads have not infrequently received total compensation that exceeded that of higher-ups on the corporate ladder. Nevertheless, the disclosed information has provided some insights into the pecuniary rewards of senior management in U.S. financial firms. -18-Lehman, two of the investment banking firms that did not survive the banking crisis intact. They contend that the top five executives in both firms were able to withdraw via cash bonuses and equity sales "substantially" more than the value of the stocks they owned prior to 2000. Despite the The authors further note that bonuses were based on annual performance, and that "no part of the cash bonus compensation was clawed back even though the 'record' financial results [in 2006 and 2007] that served as the basis for the bonuses largely evaporated." (pp. 266 -267) Insofar as selling their equity positions in their firms, Bebchuk et. al. point out that these executives were regularly selling shares, implying that "executives had incentives to place some weight on short-term stock market prices throughout the period." (p. 268) And they do not feel that any significance should be attached to the constraints imposed on both Bear Stearns and Lehman managers, who were prohibited from selling their stock bonuses for five years from the date of the award (although Lehman's option grants could be exercised earlier depending upon the firm's stock price performance). (p. 269)
The authors conclusion appears to be overly cautious, indeed lame:
The question is whether the executives ... had incentives to run the firms in a way that involved an excessive probability (though by no means a certainty) of large losses at some uncertain date down the road. Our analysis indicates that the pay arrangements at the firms ... did provide some such incentives.... [But while] the firms' executives had incentives to take excessive risk, it should be stressed, [that] does not imply that their decisions were in fact affected by such incentives. (p. 274 -275) Fahlenbrach and Stulz (F-S) examine compensation mechanisms in a broader sample of banks
The process is complex for a number of reasons among them being reported compensation is often not only due to 30 annual performance but also current payments made for prior year awards and the need to value both restricted shares and equity options when they are out of the money.
Options are not included, but there is no indication in the text that F-S distinguished between those held outright and 31 those shares that were owned but not yet available for sale because of their deferred status. However, it is quite likely that the latter were but a small proportion of the total equity ownership. Moreover, insofar as some deferred shares became available for sale during the 2007 -2008 period, the actual percentages noted in the figure would even have been smaller. , and argue that this, together with his reputation, provided powerful incentives to maximize long-term shareholder value going forward. We say, given relatively low cash compensation in investment banks, it is not too surprising that the CEO cashed out one third of his equity holdings to diversify his stake and reduce his exposure to the company. In contrast, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann focus on the $470 million liquidated between 2000 and 2006, and indirectly argue that this, together with short vesting conditions, gave Dick Fuld such a large wealth that he would be willing to take on excessive risks. What Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann cannot explain is why Dick Fuld voluntary held $950 million in equity in his own bank if he knew that he was taking excessive risks. It is simply not true that Dick Fuld had no skin in the game. In short, while Bebchuk et. al. themselves suggest that incentives might have played a role in financial firms focusing on short-term results, they are unwilling to conclude that such was indeed the case. Fahlenbrach and Stultz find no evidence that the incentive structure of senior management led to risk-taking that benefitted themselves at the expense either of shareholders or other stakeholders in the firms. Instead, they argue that given the significant stakes held in their firms by senior management, their long-term interests were appropriately aligned to those of the stockholders.
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Unfortunately, both these studies, which creatively utilize the available data, must be qualified by the data paucity, which is too limited to reach a conclusive response to the question: How It is instructive to point out that the incentive structure for senior management in virtually all these firms was similar. Bonuses were a multiple of salaries, equity grants and options were common, and to a smaller or lesser extent, deferred annual compensation was in place. Hence, prima facie, the compensation structure could not be a significant reason for the differing results. In September 2007, with Wall Street confronting a crisis caused by too many souring mortgages, Citigroup executives gathered in a wood-paneled library to assess their own well-being. There, Citigroup's chief executive, Charles O. Prince III, learned for the first time that the bank owned about $43 billion in mortgage-related assets. He asked Thomas G. Maheras, who oversaw trading at the bank, whether everything was O.K. Mr. Maheras told his boss that no big losses were looming, according to people briefed on the meeting who would speak only on the condition that they not be named.
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While it is true, as Prince later testified to the FCIC, that these holdings were only two percent of 37 total Citigroup assets and that they were highly-rated, these toxic assets brought Citigroup to its knees.
One can never know whether policy at AIG or Citigroup would have changed had their CEOs been adequately informed. The evidence from other major financial corporations is decidedly mixed.
To generalize, the CEOs at all these firms were charismatic and highly-competitive, indeed driven individuals whose personal performance, while measured in dollars, transcended financial rewards. By be nothing more toxic.'" p. 194 note. A slightly different quotation is cited in FCIC, p. 20, which further notes that Mozillo was "nervous" and responded to colleagues who claimed competitors were doing the same: '''There was a time when savings and loans were doing things because their competitors were doing it,' he told the other executives. 'They all went broke.'" Even more telling is Mozillo's warning to senior executives concerning loans made to investors and speculators rather than to those who planned to live in their homes: "These loans could bring 'financial and reputational catastrophe.'" FCIC, p. 108. 
Sorkin depicts Fuld as follows:
Although Fuld stands no more than five feet ten inches tall, he has an intimidating presence.... A fitness buff and a weightlifter, Fuld looked like someone you didn't want to take on in a fight, and he had the intensity to match.... Within Lehman, Fuld earned a reputation as a single-minded trader who took gruff from no one. of Lehman's executive committee, in trying to convince Fuld that "This is not going to be just a credit crunch. This is going to be the granddaddy of all credit crunches. And you're trying to buy into it." Fuld's response, according to McDonald, was "I don't want you tell me why we can't.... I want you to be creative and tell me how we can. You're much too cautious. What are you afraid of?" (pp. 234 -235; dates are unclear; apparently this took place over a period of early through mid-2007). Gelband resigned in May 2007. He was called back by the new president, Mike McCabe after Fuld's long-reigning president and friend, Joseph Gregory, was deposed in June 2008. However, Fuld was still the CEO, the titular head of the firm and the ultimate decision-maker.
I am not arguing with the benefit of hindsight that Gelband was right and Fuld was wrong. In any organization, the buck stops somewhere -decisions are made by the chief executive -and at Lehman that was Fuld. I am arguing that the very nature of this or any corporation with a strong leader faces turning points in its life, and there is no way to predict whether decisions will go well or not. As Kahneman says, luck plays a very significant role. More on this point later. McDonald reinforces this views in his chapter titled "King Richard Thunders Forward." Now, Dick had either been born or somehow evolved into a very strange character, remote from his key people, apparently allergic to the engine room of the business, and obsessively jealous of his hold on power.
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The 31 floor of Lehman Brothers seemed totally disconnected from the rest of the firm. The Last of the Imperious Rich: Lehman Brothers, 1844 -2008 (2010 Cohan writes a few lines further: "His brash, take-charge mentality offended some of his partners who thought he spoke too quickly or made decisions too impulsively. 'He's an action-oriented person, and one of his great skills was identifying smart people and absorbing good ideas that they had, and then pulling the trigger,' was how one of Paulson's rivals at Goldman described him, choosing every word very carefully. the CEOs and their teams -highly-motivated, hard-driving, and extremely-intelligent men working in a stressful, volatile environment managing corporate behemoths. The advice the CEOs received was often contradictory, but the ultimate decision rested with them. Their attention to or lack of concern toward the consequences of their traders' and managers' actions and the compensation policies that spurred them on was ultimately their failure -a failure of senior management and specifically, the CEOs. Need we repeat Kahneman's equation: great success = a little more talent + a lot of luck? That some succeeded while others failed was a matter of luck rather than skill.
IV. The questionable role of risk managers and boards of directors
CEOs are not assumed to be fully independent agents. Where were the risk managers, who were charged with instilling caution? And if one would argue that the risk managers ultimately reported to the CEOs and their warnings could be disregarded, where were the boards of the banks, the legal overseers, who were mandated to monitor management behavior and actions?
The short answer to the first question is that banks differed in the attention they paid to their risk officers. In the case of Lehman, for example, the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) was totally marginalized, while at Goldman, as indicated previously, significant attention was paid to risk.
However, that, too, was a matter of CEO decision, and cannot be separated from the commanding role of the CEOs of the various financial institutions that were central to the financial crisis.
As to the boards, they were for the most part, irrelevant. To expect boards of directors of globally-active financial institutions to be involved in anything other than broad strategic decisions is corporations, where flux is not the normal state of affairs, and boards can effectively shape long-term strategy.) Furthermore, as will be shown shortly, the boards themselves were in the vast majority of instances incapable of understanding the finer points of investment banking, and even if they were, 61 were dependent upon management as their information source.
Risk management. Goldman's approach to risk management can be summarized briefly:
Goldman is well know for having one of the best risk measurement and management systems on Wall Street... One example...[:] all companies engaged in trading activities have to be concerned with trader behavior. At Goldman, there is a parallel organization to the trading group that is charged with pricing trading positions, limiting excessive concentration, and managing risk. That group has people with comparable skill, stature, and compensation. Finally, Goldman's Risk Committee was firm-wide, met weekly, and was headed by the COO and CFO, with the CEO in frequent attendance. In short, while ultimately policy decisions were Blankfein's, they were influenced by the firm's culture and institutional concern with risk.
No greater contrast to Goldman is that of Lehman under Fuld. McDonald writes of the marginalization of Madelyn Antoncic, the CRO at Lehman during the early part of the crisis. Antoncic, a consummate risk professional, was "asked to leave the room whenever there were tense issues notes: "At a number of banks, the lower prestige and status of risk management staff vis-a-vis traders also played an important role." p. 12.
Whether having the CRO report directly to the board as mentioned in Kirkpatrick, p. 20 will make a significant 70 difference depends crucially on the relationship of the CEO to the board. As will become apparent in this section, for the most part boards were weak and tended to be supportive of the CEO, so such a reform would not have mattered much. One noteworthy anecdote -the CRO of MF Global reported to the board a number of times that he was concerned with the riskiness of the firm's sovereign risk bets taken by the CEO, Jon Corzine. The board supported Corzine, demoted the CRO, who left soon after. Boards of Directors at Financial Institutions. As noted earlier, because investment banks and the investment subsidiaries of bank holding companies operated in volatile markets with balance sheets that are marked-to-market and hence capable of moving by billions of dollars daily, and, further, because during the years prior to and during the crisis they operated with their own funds for their own accounts, one should not expect even an experienced board to play a role in the day-to-day operations of the banks. And although it was these routine activities that brought the banks to the precipice, and Lehman over it, it is unrealistic to expect boards to exercise oversight over trading activities or even to set meaningful and enforceable limits to risk. That is the proper role of management, not boards. For boards, the expression goes, "Noses in, fingers out." New York Stock Exchange rules mandate that a majority of directors be independent. That leaves significant scope for 75 insiders. Moreover, as will be evident immediately, independence of directors hardly suggests that they will be able to institute and implement policies independent of management. But it would be wrong to see the boards as independent entities, poised at the pinnacle of an hierarchical arrangement, with management responsive to its directives and oversight. First, senior corporate managers typically sit on their own boards, and may hold a significant minority of seats thereon. Indeed, it is not unusual for the CEO to also serve as the chair of the board, which was 75 common for most of U.S. financial institutions prior and during the crisis. Nor is it out of the 76 ordinary for the board committee chairs be held by executive (i.e., management-related) directors and even the CEO. Second, independent directors are most often nominated by management -election of 77 board nominees is virtually assured -making it still more questionable whether they can exert independent oversight. Third, because the directors do not obtain information from their own company sources but through management, the transmittal of incomplete or even incorrect information further Wong, p. 25: "As one financial executive put it, management presentations could be delivered 'in such a complex way 78 that [the non-executive directors] would be prevented from asking whether the emperor is naked for fear of looking stupid.'" Wong adds: "In recent years, there have been high-profile incidents of CEOs failing to inform or involve their boards on critical developments...." Merrill's O'Neal was "allowed to resign" after ignoring the board's request not to pursue a merger. Lowenstein, pp. 109 -110.
Wong, "The all-powerful CEO bad for the boardroom," Financial Times, November 13, 2011. 79 Wong, "Elevating...", p. 13. -36-leads to questions of independent oversight. Finally, it is not unheard of that management, even after 78 receiving explicit directives from the board of directors, just ignored them. That may well be due to "the disparity in stature between the chief executive and other board members," so that the CEO 79 views the board as advisory rather than determinative.
In addition, independent directors' commitment to their board is limited. Invariably, their directorships are part-time, and so their devotion to their tasks is necessarily part-time. Should they be plied with substantial information, the problem of information overload surfaces. Furthermore, do the 80 directors have the requisite expertise and if so, is their knowledge-base current? As will be shown presently, the backgrounds of directors and hence their ability to monitor specifically the banks varied drastically, leaving one to conclude "No" in all too many instances. 81 Again, we highlight the contrast between Lehman and Goldman Sachs. The composition of the Lehman board for many years prior to its bankruptcy is, in retrospect, startling. The 10-member board was chaired by CEO Fuld, who was the second longest serving member. By 2007, the majority had served over 10 years. The youngest member was 50, the oldest 80, and the average director age was not quite 70 years. As to the occupational distribution of the nine independent directors, five had held prior to their retirement top-level management positions in the nonfinancial world, one was a senior Nell Minow, who rated firms on corporate governance, attributed poor governance at Lehman to the board including "an 82 actress, a theatrical producer, and an admiral, and not one person who understood financial derivatives." FCIC, p. 327. Dina Merrill, the actress, resigned from the board in 2006 at the age of 83, having served for 18 years. See also Dennis K. Berman, "Where Was Lehman's Board?" WSJ blogs, September 15, 2008. Nestor, p. 16. 83 Pp. 225 -226. 84 I have been unable to discover when the board was told that bankruptcy was pending, but I'm under the impression that -37-military officer also active in the non-profit world, one hailed from the entertainment industry, and only two bore some relationship to the financial world. Noteworthy, these two were the 80-year elders, and one might wonder how current they were in the intricacies of complex financial instruments and their risk profiles.
82
Lehman's board did have a risk committee; it met infrequently -only twice during 2007. 83 Moreover, given the composition of the board, it is highly questionable whether the risk committee could act independently of management.
If we can rely on the acerbic observations of McDonald, one can obtain a sense of the relationship of the Lehman board to Fuld.
King Richard had even turned Lehman's board of directors into a kind of largely irrelevant lower chamber. This was yet another group to rubber-stamp his decisions and collect generous fees. It was not for supplying well-meant and lucid wisdom in the current wild marketplace, but for agreeing with the monarch, accepting his all-knowing take on the bank's investments.
84
In the end, of course, it was the Lehman board who directed the bank's attorneys to file for bankruptcy in September 2008.
85
The story at Goldman differs markedly. Risk, as mentioned earlier, was a major concern at Goldman and was monitored at the highest management levels. It was natural that this concern pervaded the board as well. Nestor Advisors wrote: The details of the Goldman Sachs board (2004) differed in a number of ways from that of Lehman. While the two most senior members of Goldman, Paulson and Blankfein served on the board, the former as chairman, the other eight members were independent and primarily from industry. One was an academic, and three were actively involved in the financial industry. Moreover, the average age of the non-executive board members was 59 years, with the oldest director an outlier at 68. In general, not only were the directors younger than was the Lehman board and more inclined to be active in the financial world, their stature in the corporate universe was also weightier. Hence, the difference between Lehman and Goldman is palpable. But it is doubtful whether that made a difference in the respective boards' ability to act as counterweights -if need be -to their banks' senior management.
The situation at other banks varied but the conclusion remains unchanged. In an arbitrary sample of 4 additional financial institutions for 2004 (AIG, Countrywide Financial, IndyMac, and Morgan Stanley), the average age of directors was in the low 60s, except for IndyMac, where the average was 53. In terms of the independent directors' experience, the majority were not current or former financial services industry executives, but in all the boards, a significant minority was. In all, the CEO was also the chair of the board. At first blush, no obvious correlation can be detected between Mayo, p. 159. 87 Prager, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007/8 (Austrian Colloquium, 4/12) -39-board composition and firm outcome during the crisis. The boards did not vary much either in composition or experience and yet the impact of the crisis on these four firms differed radically -AIG was virtually nationalized, Countrywide was taken over by the Bank of America, IndyMac was closed by FDIC, and Morgan Stanley remained independent although it transformed itself into a bank holding company.
In short, neither CROs or boards are likely to exert a significant counterweight on CEOs for any of reasons suggested in this section. CROs are always subordinate to the CEO even when they report directly to their boards. As for the directors, it is the exceptional board that is not dominated by its CEO either for want of information, for lack of the requisite technical ability, or for inadequate commitment. How much more so is this true in the investment banking industry, where decisions that could bankrupt the firm or make it highly profitable do not always lend themselves to thoughtful prior CEOs of leading financial institutions before and after the crises were a power unto themselves.
Unless they were egregiously derelict in their duties, engaged in criminal acts and were caught, were ousted by ambitious subordinates, or were just unlucky, CEO tenure and power will remain undiminished.
V. Legislative/Regulatory Responses
Reform subsequent to the financial crisis was not limited to the United States. Some regulatory changes in the UK and the EU were implemented, while others remain in the discussion stage. For the most part, these reforms are directed to responding to past deficiencies in the belief (hope?) that repairing the past will prevent future financial debacles. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act (formally, "The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act") is an omnibus piece of legislation that among other provisions aims to identify SIFIs (Systemically-Important Financial Institutions), to strengthen bank capital and liquidity, proposes reducing counterparty risk by clearing derivative transactions through clearing houses, imposes greater "skin in the game" on securitizers, and mandates CRAs, which are to become irrelevant in bank asset evaluations, to reduce conflicts of interests between marketers and analysts. The so-called Volcker amendment included in Dodd-Frank restricts proprietary activities by banks, so that a regulated financial institution cannot trade in any substantial way for its own account. However, while Dodd-Frank and similar EU regulation will set the framework for banking conduct for years to come, they are not my concern here. Instead, this section briefly examines some of the proposals relating to incentives, merely to give a flavor rather than to place them under the microscope. In and of themselves, they may be seen as therapeutic as well as prophylactic. However, I contend that the underlying issue -management control -is not only ignored but is fundamentally incapable of being revamped without entirely destroying the essential fabric of the financial marketplace.
The concern with misaligned incentives and the focus on bonuses predicated on short-term results independent of long-term consequences is reflected in the reforms in a number of ways. The Dodd-Frank Act mandated that the federal regulatory authorities develop rules that require all financial institutions to report compensation arrangements and to prohibit all incentive rewards that encourage "inappropriate risks that could lead to a material financial loss." Boards are to be more involved with company-wide risk, and are to assure that compensation policies take risk into account. are intrinsic. Compensation of "executive officers" cannot be more than 50 percent in cash and must be deferred for at least 3 years. Regulations will also impose longer-term compensation mandates on other parties who could jeopardize the viability of the bank. However, no clawback provisions related to flawed longer-term outcomes of short-term actions are mentioned.
In fact, the Federal Reserve reports that banks have made much progress in better aligning compensation practices with risk. While noting that deferred compensation had been common in the banking community, "pre-crisis deferral arrangements typically were not structured to fully take account of risk or actual outcomes. Almost all firms now use vehicles for some employees that adjust downward the amount of deferred incentive compensation that is paid if losses are large." The report 89 expresses less confidence about measures related to the compensation/risk balance at the board level -"Effectiveness will depend on the attentiveness of members of compensation committees to risk-taking incentives."
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The EU has proceeded more aggressively. While the underlying philosophy is identical, the 91 constraints on compensation proceed somewhat further. First, a broad umbrella covers those whose activities could jeopardize a bank -senior executives, directors, management responsible for day-today functions, responsible staff in the risk management and finance department personnel, and traders -42-and trading desk managers. Second, 40 -60 percent of all "variable remunerations" (i.e., other than salaries) are to be deferred over a 3 to 5 year interval, with reassessments of consequences and therefore the possibility of future payment reductions from previously-allocated bonuses. And they are only to be partially in cash. Finally, clawbacks enter into the scheme when the long-term consequences of short-term actions merit such a response.
92
It is clear from news reports that a number of financial institutions have moved in this fundamental direction without waiting for the rules to be firmed. Only time will tell how effective 93 these measures will be or whether they will be circumvented in whole or in part.
VI. Conclusions
Two competing threads have been woven through this essay. While misaligned incentives play a dominant role in the minds of economists, it has been the contention of this paper that -as appealing as this narrative might be in explaining the financial crisis of 2007 -2008 -at best it was supportive rather than primary. We have emphasized the crucial responsibilities, actions, and errors of senior management at various U.S. financial institutions. Leadership is the crucial explanatory variable in 94 this narrative. Some CEOs were skilled and lucky, others were equally skilled but ill-starred. In retrospect, some were prescient, others were stampeded by the thundering herd. In a number of instances we have contrasted Lehman Brothers' CEO Richard Fuld with Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd
Blankfein. Yet, they were both cut from pretty much the same cloth in terms of their intelligence, work
Lewis's The Big Short, which focuses on those who forecast a collapse of derivatives, has only a few major players. To claim that policy-makers, be they legislators or regulators, can fashion a fail-safe financial structure is delusional. Hence, one cannot insure that there will not be another financial panic in the future. To be sure, policy-makers can set into motion policies designed to prevent or at least mitigate a recurrence of the 2007 -2008 crisis. They can always fight the last battle. But it is presumptuous and ahistorical to believe that it is possible to predict the source and timing of the next debacle. Optimism about prevention is sorely misplaced.
